The principle of detecting near-collisions in cryptographic algorithms such as MD5 and SHA1.

A widely used cryptographic algorithm used to secure sensitive websites, software, and corporate servers is weak enough that well-financed criminals could crack it in the next six years, a cryptographer said.

The prediction about the SHA1 algorithm, posted recently to a hash function mailing list sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, is based on calculations its author and fellow cryptographers admit are rough. The back-of-the-envelope math also incorporates several assumptions that are by no means certain. At the same time, the ability to carry out a reliable “collision attack” on SHA1 would have catastrophic effects on the security of the Internet.

Similar collision attacks on the weaker MD5 algorithm provide an example of how dire and widespread the resulting harm could be. The Flame espionage malware, which the US and Israel are believed to have unleashed to spy on sensitive Iranian networks, wielded such an exploit to hijack Microsoft’s Windows Update mechanism so the malicious program could spread from computer to computer inside an infected network. Separately, in 2008, a team of computer scientists and security researchers used the technique to forge a master secure sockets layer certificate that could authenticate virtually any website of their choosing.

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via Ars Technica » Technology Lab http://feeds.arstechnica.com/~r/arstechnica/technology-lab/~3/WZY51IpdrKw/

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